Veteran civil society activist Paata Zakareishvili, a man who commanded respect in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, became the minister dealing with the two territories.
Symbolically, he renamed his bureau the Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality. In his four years as minister, Zakareishvili held out hopes for greater dialogue and engagement.
He made it easier for the Abkhaz to travel to Georgia and access Georgian healthcare facilities, allowing them to present any identification document, including an Abkhaz passport. This remains the policy of the Georgian government. A number of service centers would be established in the village of Rukhi, near the boundary line with Abkhazia. These initiatives offered services analogous to what Transdniestrians can access in Moldova.
However, they were greeted coolly in Abkhazia. A deep philosophical difference remains. Abkhazia today is materially much better off and politically more closed than it was before the conflict.
The patron state, Russia, has made Abkhazia more secure and stable, but at the price of greatly increased influence. The geopolitical context has pushed Abkhazia even deeper into the Russian sphere.
The Abkhaz publicly supported the Russian intervention in Crimea. Inside Abkhazia, Russian news agencies and television channels dominate the media space. NGOs have come under pressure for taking Western money. Ethnic identity politics still looms large. Modern-day Abkhazia is multiethnic in daily life but is an ethnocracy in its politics.
In a parliament with thirty-five deputies, thirty-one have ethnic Abkhaz surnames and three are Armenians. The representative for the Gali district, Kakha Pertaya, is part Georgian, but otherwise no Georgians or Russians hold office. The government and presidential office are also almost entirely staffed by ethnic Abkhaz.
This is a result of the Abkhaz being the titular nation of their republic in Soviet times and of a war fought on an ethnic basis. In practice this means that—in contrast to the situations in Transdniestria and northern Cyprus—there is still a strong social stigma associated with procuring Georgian services or civil documents, even if an individual might be tempted to do so.
The ethnic Georgians in Gali also face many difficulties, in educating their children in Georgian and crossing the Inguri River into the neighboring Samegrelo region. In , the Abkhaz and Russians made crossing harder when they closed several checkpoints along the river, leaving only one route open.
In a series of meetings in October , Abkhaz decisionmakers said EU engagement would still be welcome—but only if no conditions about ties with Georgia were attached. He claimed that there was healthy trade with Turkey, Russia, and to Europe via Russia. We have survived twenty-five years without them. These statements should not be taken entirely at face value. Yet by publicly taking this tough line on status, the Abkhaz risk self-isolation, in other words a closed border and full reliance on Russia.
By one estimate, more than 80 percent of the crop in Abkhazia was destroyed. Can anyone change this negative dynamic? Several groups in Abkhazia—students, businessmen, journalists—would almost certainly support different policies, but currently keep quiet.
The Armenian community in Abkhazia is another constituency whose views are hard to discern but would benefit from more engagement. Three avenues for renewed engagement are worth exploring. One is higher education. Vladimir Delba, vice rector of the Abkhaz State University AGU , asserted in an interview that his university had many international contacts but worked chiefly with the Russian Federation, which had been helping the school with a major renovation program.
However, some students and teachers expressed a hope for international outreach beyond Russia. But it should be possible, with Georgian consent, to build bilateral ties between the university and some European universities. Secondly, the Abkhaz are also interested in improving their international mobility. Currently, residents of Abkhazia continue to travel abroad—or are refused a visa—on the basis of their Russian passports. Whether visas are issued or not remains at the discretion of different EU governments, which take different views on the matter.
The problem has worsened over the last two years. There are reports of young Abkhaz being unable to travel anywhere abroad beyond Russia, as they have not received Russian passports. This is because Russia argues that Abkhazia is recognized by Russia and therefore Abkhaz passports should be sufficient.
No alternative scheme acceptable to all sides has yet been found. But there is a shared interest here to find a new solution—from Georgians who do not want to see the Abkhaz taking only Russian documents and from Abkhaz who want to travel abroad.
A third area for engagement comes in trade. There is a little sea trade with Turkey, though it has been declared illicit by Georgia. Economic links with Georgia are tenuous. There is potential for more trade from Abkhazia across the Inguri into Georgia and on to Europe.
A recent International Crisis Group paper describes how a worsening economic environment, cuts in Russian funding, and a depreciated ruble mean that Abkhaz businessmen are looking to build ties with the West to import European goods and export products such as hazelnuts that can reportedly fetch almost five times the price in the West that they do in Russia.
However, unlike Abkhaz businesses, Transdniestrian businesses are prepared to accept Moldovan customs, certificates of origin, and customs regulations. Determining who is in charge of customs controls on the Abkhazia-Russia border would be an especially big challenge. This does not mean that a deal on trade using creative status-neutral mechanisms cannot be achieved, just that it requires a high level of political will, including from Russia, which is in short supply.
More creativity is certainly required to overcome this unsatisfactory situation. Tbilisi has fashioned more progressive ideas toward Abkhazia in recent years than at any time since the conflict ended in , but it unfortunately has many fewer tools at its disposal.
This in turn leaves only a narrow window for internationals to interact with Abkhazia. The best that can be said in is that that window has not yet fully closed.
There is no single public source on EU funding in Abkhazia. Georgia country profile. Abkhazia votes with no peace in sight. Russian president visits Abkhazia. Putin message clear in Abkhazia. Territory : Abkhazia Status : Break-away region of Georgia. Declared independence Not recognized internationally. Population : , approximately , Capital : Sukhumi Major languages : Abkhaz, Russian Currency : Rouble Major religions : Christianity, Islam Natural resources : Agricultural, primarily citrus fruit, hazelnuts, tea, timber; some coal, hydro-electric power.
Image source, Getty Images. Internet usage is growing fast. Erasing fear and protecting the security of minority groups will be essential if Georgia wants to reintegrate Abkhaz and South Ossetian people into society successfully. The confidence-building measures are necessary whether or not Abkhazia and South Ossetia are open to reuniting with Georgia.
Demonstrating respect and strengthening minority rights are essential building blocks of democracy that do not require the GoG to influence directly or engage with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian population.
Instead, they are essential for creating a state that is suitable for minority groups if reintegration ever becomes a realistic possibility.
Keeping the conflicts frozen is not a sustainable permanent policy, as the current reality does not satisfy the demands of either Georgia or the breakaway regions. Strategic patience risks renewed violence if the situation in South Caucasus does not settle in the long run. Based on the geopolitical situation in Europe, it is evident that by choosing the Western route, Georgia is moving further away from its territorial integrity.
Russia uses the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the means to compete with the West; thus, the more integrated Georgia becomes with the West, the more likely it is that Russia will strengthen its grip on Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Neither fully supporting Georgia nor taking a modest approach towards Russia is an attractive option. However, choosing Russia over Europe will not eventually pay off for Georgia. At the same time, Georgia cannot ignore Russia while it turns to Europe, as such a strategy might trigger Russia to revamp its presence in Georgia. Engagement with Russia through cooperating on the common interests is a good short-term strategy, but appeasement does not imply that Georgia should steer away from the Western route and stop pursuing the EU and NATO membership.
Instead, Georgia should contain the crisis until the favorable geopolitical changes in the region permit the GoG to discuss reintegration with Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders. The EU offers integration in the common market that Russia cannot provide. Besides, the EU accession process requires comprehensive democratic reforms to be carried out in the areas of human rights, political freedom, and the rule of law.
The prospect of EU membership serves as a powerful source of development for Georgia. The EU enlargement brought substantial economic benefits to the post-communist countries.
While it started with three members Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan , it now only has five, and a few members, like Belarus and Kazakhstan, have expressed that they will leave if their interests are at stake. Russia accounts for 1. Russia is in need of Western investments and lifted sanctions, but the trend has been the opposite.
The sanctions incurred against Russia after the Crimean War continue to be in effect and have weakened the financial aid allocated to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, forcing them to search for other sources of revenue.
Although Russia is trying to reenter the international economic stage, countries that used to depend on Russian energy are looking to diversify their sources of oil supply. In , Transparency International ranked Russia as the th most corrupt country in the world Transparency International. However, such a development of events is nothing but an early prediction and depends on multiple circumstances to converge towards the same result.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia depend on Russia, but Russia cannot provide attractive economic and political prospects to neither of these regions. By keeping the conflicts frozen before such changes appear, Georgia will allow space for development without the burden of renewed conflicts on its territory.
Georgia should also look to diversify the strategic and economic partnerships with other allies that recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Georgian territories. By taking such a route in the long-term, Georgia will equalize the playing field and increase the leverage against Russia. If Georgia becomes a safe democratic country that is part of the EU, leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will find their political, social, and economic prospects in Georgia more appealing than their future as de facto independent states that entirely depend on Russia.
In case Georgia builds the state suitable for Abkhazs and South Ossetians by strengthening minority rights and integrating minority groups in the society, the chances are that leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be more open to discussions about reconciliation than they are today. To sum up, it is safe to conclude that maintaining the status quo is the most reasonable option for the GoG to pursue in the short-term. As a rational actor, Georgia should calculate costs and benefits of the proposed policy choices, identify risks associated with each, and choose the optimal policy accordingly.
This essay suggested three potential ways of dealing with the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, namely a light footprint approach, a heavy footprint approach, and strategic patience. Abandoning the pursuit of restoration is not a realistic choice and is not popular among Georgians.
Therefore, Georgia should maintain the desire of restoring territorial integrity, but choose between strong-willed and diplomatic tactics towards attaining the goal. The proposed strategy does not have any major implications in the near future, as it does not aim for sudden or dramatic victory in conflict resolution.
Georgia should acknowledge the complicated relationship with Russia and accept that Moscow will not change its stance on Abkhazia and South Ossetia anytime soon. Therefore, the GoG should carefully determine the risks and benefits of every step taken towards solving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Given that Georgia targets the EU membership, it should keep building democracy and strengthen minority rights whether or not it affects the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the long run, Georgia should remain patient and wait until the changing geopolitical situation in Europe allows the right opportunity to advance negotiations with Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders. Peaceful resolution of these conflicts will reduce tensions not only in the Caucasus but in the whole region.
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Caucasus 1. Introduction The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ensuing disorder has caused multiple territorial disputes in the Caucasus region. Background Abkhazia Abkhazia is a region located at the Black Sea coast in the Northwest part of Georgia, sharing a border with Russia. Geopolitical Setting The ethnic conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be understood within the context of the post-Cold War geopolitical environment. The Rationale for Action Georgia Solving the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is equally important for each actor involved.
The European Union and Russia The frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are important not only for the immediate actors but also for the relations between the EU and Russia, as well as ethnic conflict management in general. Policy Options The three possible approaches that the GoG can take to solve the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be placed on a spectrum of policy choices in between the two extremes of disengagement and the surge strategy.
Light Footprint Approach A light footprint approach towards the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia implies that the GoG will not only take no actions to restore the control over the separatist regions but will also deprioritize the territorial integrity from its foreign policy agenda. Short-Term Action Cooperation In order to effectively implement the containment policy, the GoG must take several concrete steps to improve the existing situation.
Long-Term Orientation Keeping the conflicts frozen is not a sustainable permanent policy, as the current reality does not satisfy the demands of either Georgia or the breakaway regions. Conclusion To sum up, it is safe to conclude that maintaining the status quo is the most reasonable option for the GoG to pursue in the short-term. Bartuzi, Wojciech, and Krzysztof Strachota. Baldwin, Clive et al. Campos, Nauro, et al. Charap, Samuel, and Cory Welt.
Cornell, Svante. Getting Georgia Right. Brussels: Centre for European Studies, German, Tracey. Harding, Luke. Jones, Stephen. Kaufmann, Chaim. King, Charles.
Kozak, Tetiana. Lake, David, and Donald Rothchild. Lomsadze, Giorgi. Mrachek, Alexis. Nikuradze, Mari. Sanders, Katie. Sindelar, Daisy. Way, Lucan A. Whitmore, Brian. Zurcher, Christoph. The Post-Soviet Wars. Please Consider Donating Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing.
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